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I. Introduction
In Gilju, on the Sea of Japan, at 10:36am on October 9,
2006, an exclusive club gained a new member, as the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) tested a nuclear
weapon.' The rest of the club learned of their new member almost
I See Richard Johnson, A Rogue Joins the Club, GLOBE & MAIL (Canada), Oct. 10,
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immediately, as listening posts detected the seismic event. 2 The
other eight nations wielding nuclear weapon technology had been
tipped off six days earlier when North Korea indicated it possessed
a nuclear weapon that it intended to.
3
North Korea's nuclear test elicited a singularity of response
that has not happened since the response of "mutual assured
destruction" during the Cold War. The Western powers were
predictably incensed, but China's response was surprising; China,
a long-time North Korea apologist, called the act "brazen" and
urged Kim Jong I1 to return his country to the Six Party Talks.4
Countries were outraged at the thought that a "rogue" nation had
acquired the 5 reatest destructive power on earth and joined the
nuclear club. Furthermore, there were calls from far and wide
offering suggestions on how to deal with what many believed was
a breach of the non-proliferation regime. It was commonplace to
assume that North Korea had seriously broken international law by
acquiring nuclear weapons through a clandestine program North
Korea and was therefore deserving of coercive enforcement. But a
closer look at international law as it stood on the morning of
October 6, 2006 reveals a much murkier picture. North Korea
withdrew from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
2006, at A 11.
2 See id.
3 See North Korea Pledges to Test Nuclear Bomb, CNN, Oct. 4, 2006,
http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/asiapcf/10/03/nkorea.nuclear/index.html (last visited
Sept. 23, 2007).
4 See North Korea Claims Nuclear Test, BBC NEWS, Oct. 9, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6032525.stm (last visited Sept. 23, 2007). See
also China, U.S. Urge N. Korea to Return to Talks, CHINA DAILY, Oct. 20, 2006,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2006-10/20/content_713303.htm (last visited Sept.
23, 2007).
5 See, e.g., Paul E. Boehm, Decennial Dija vu: Reassessing a Nuclear North
Korea on the 1995 Supply Agreement's Ten-Year Anniversary, 14 TuL. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 81, 87 (2005) (describing specific instances of North Korean state-sponsored
terrorism); Glen Kessler & Steve Baker, Bush's 'Axis of Evil' Comes Back to Haunt
United States, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 2006 at A12 (describing how in his 2002 State of
the Union Speech President Bush labeled North Korea part of an 'axis of evil'); Derwin
Pereira, Challenge of engaging a rising power; Fearing a challenge in Asia, the US is
building stronger alliances and restructuring its forces, STRAIT TIMES (Sing.), Sept. 10,
2006, available at http://app.mfa.gov.sg/pr/read-content.asp?View,5276 (last visited
Sept. 4, 2007) (noting that China is building a missile shield to protect itself from rogue
nations like North Korea).
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67in 1994 and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003. 7
Because North Korea was not a party to the NPT when it tested its
nuclear device, this comment will examine North Korea's conduct
using the case study method to answer the following question
about the current non-proliferation regime: did North Korea break
the law or violate other international obligations in acquiring and
testing nuclear weapons?
This paper is structured as a case-study, in which Part II
provides a general account of the non-proliferation regime and
North Korea's checkered past within it. Part III explores
multilateral treaties and concepts of international law to determine
if North Korea broke the law by testing a nuclear weapon. Part IV
takes up the issue of enforcement and, by doing so, argues that
enforcement poses serious problems for the international
community.
II. Historical Background
The Nonproliferation Treaty was created on July 1, 19688
in an effort to wrestle the hostility of mutual assured destruction
from the hands of the superpowers by vesting the knowledge of
nuclear power in an international body.9 The non-proliferation
regime was predicated upon the nuclear "haves" sharing
information about peaceful nuclear technology with the nuclear
"have-nots."' 0  The idea was that nuclear technology could be
better contained if non-nuclear states were given the benefits of
6 In Focus: IAEA and DPRK, IAEA.org, http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/
IaeaDprk/fact-sheet-may2003.shtnl (last visited Sept. 4, 2007) [hereinafter IAEA
Factsheet].
7 Andrew Ward, N Korea Quits Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, FIN. TIMES
(London), Apr. 11, 2003, at 11.
8 See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Jul. 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T.
483, 729 U.N.T.S. 10485 [hereinafter NPT].
9 See THOMAS GRAHAM, JR & DAMIEN J. LAVERA, CORNERSTONES OF SECURITY:
ARMS CONTROL TREATIES IN THE NUCLEAR ERA 99 (NEED TO ADD PUBLISHER 2003). See
also, Bhalchandra M. Udgaonkar, A Fissile Materials Cut-off, in A NUCLEAR WEAPON-
FREE WORLD: STEPS ALONG THE WAY 65, 65-6 (Frank Blackaby & Tom Milne ed., 2000)
(detailing how the Baruch Plan, the precursor of the NPT, was altered from its original
form which gave all control over nuclear technology in the world to a single international
organization).
10 See Raju G.C. Thomas, The Renewed NPT: Old Wine in New Bottles?, in THE
NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME 1, 10 (Raju G.C. Thomas ed., 1998).
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
nuclear power in exchange for foregoing the development of their
own nuclear programs which may have yielded nuclear weapons
technology in the future. I
The NPT mandates that the non-weapon states execute a
safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy
Agency. 12 The safeguards agreements outline and categorize all
peaceful nuclear activities in a country.' 3 Safeguards agreements
also enumerate the types assistance that the IAEA will provide in
pursuing any of the nuclear power projects.14  Nuclear weapon
states do not have to conclude safeguards agreements, because
negotiating such a clause would have been impossible at the height
of the Cold War when the NPT was drafted.' The NPT relies on
the IAEA to monitor compliance and the United Nations Security
Council to enforce noncompliance.
North Korea's involvement with the non-proliferation
regime began when it joined the IAEA in 1974.16 North Korea
then joined the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state in 1985.'
Monitoring by IAEA inspectors is a central part of any safeguard
agreement. 18  In 1993, the IAEA inspectors discovered a
discrepancy in the amount of fuel at the Yongbyon nuclear
facility; the IAEA concluded that North Korean could be trying to
reprocess fuel. 19
Reprocessing spent fuel rods from certain peaceful nuclear
pursuits is aimed at creating fissile material - or the fuel for a
nuclear weapon. Fissile material can be used to fuel a slow
11 See id.
12 See NPT, supra note 8, art. III.
13 See id.
14 See id.
15 See Thomas, supra note 10.
16 IAEA Factsheet, supra note 7.
17 Id.
is See Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency art. XII sec. A(6), Oct.
23, 1956, 8 U.S.T. 1093, 276 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter IAEA Statute].
19 See IAEA Factsheet, supra note 7; Bruce Cumings, Nuclear Imbalance of
Terror: The American Surveillance Regime and North Korea's Nuclear Programme, in
THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME 207,227 (Raju G.C. Thomas ed., 1998).
20 See Nuclear Threat Initiative, A Tutorial on Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear-
Explosive Materials: Production of Nuclear-Explosive Materials,
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controlled chain reaction, which is what happens in nuclear
reactors.2 1 When fission occurs rapidly a large amount of energy
is released resulting in a nuclear explosion.2 2 There are only a few
forms of fissionable material which are actually categorized as
fissile material. 23  A nuclear weapons program can be based on
plutonium or uranium fissile material; there is reason to believe
North Korea has pursued a weapons program using both
plutonium and uranium.
24
Obtaining fissile material is widely regarded as the most
difficult step in acquiring nuclear weapons.25 The rarity of fissile
material is the reason the non-proliferation regime is aimed at
limiting the availability of fissile material as a means to stop
proliferation.
26
27The Korean War has never technically ended, and it is
upon its vestiges that the crises with North Korea have arisen. The
conflict was a microcosm of the Cold War, with the United States
and South Korea squaring off in a conflict against North Korea,
the USSR, and China. The Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) which
separates North and South Korea stands as a reminder of how
fractured the diplomatic relations are between the United States
and North Korea.28
http://www.nti.org/e-researchlcnwmloverviewltechnical4.asp (last visited Sept. 4, 2007)
(describing the risks and difficulties posed by the reprocessing process).
21 See Nuclear Threat Initiative, A Tutorial on Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear-
Explosive Materials: Nuclear Basics, http://www.nti.org/e-research/cnwm/
overview/technical 1.asp (last visited Sept. 4, 2007) [hereinafter Nuclear Basics].
22 See id. (listing the five ways that a nuclear bomb does damage as: fireball,
shockwave, prompt radiation, thermal energy release, and radioactive fallout).
23 See id. (citing the most important isotopes as plutonium-239, uranium-233, and
uranium-235).
24 See Andrew Gumbel, CIA Backpedals on Enrichment Claim, CANBERRA TIMES
(Australia), Mar. 3, 2007 at A16.
25 See Emma Chanlett-Avery & Sharon Squassoni, North Korea's Nuclear Test:
Motivations, Implications, and U.S. Options, CRS Report for Congress Order Code
RL33709, at I I n.20 (Oct. 24, 2006).
26 See NPT, supra note 8, art. III sec. 2.
27 See The Korean War Armistice, BBC NEWS, Jul. 23, 2003,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilasia-pacific/2774931.stm (last visited Sept. 23, 2007)
(detailing how the simple ceasefire of July 27, 1953 left open the full resolution of
hostilities).
28 See Koreas [sic] Trade Warnings Over Border, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 9, 2006 at A6
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
William Perry actually identifies five separate nuclear
crises involving North Korea. 29 The Korean War was the first of
these crises because both the USSR and the United States
threatened to use nuclear weapons throughout the conflict.30 Perry
argues that North Korea engages in a predictable pattern of
conduct involving its nuclear program: When it wants something,
North Korea will instigate trouble by engaging in brinkmanship,
inevitably leading to a nuclear showdown played out on the world
theater. Following this line of reasoning, Perry would characterize
North Korea's testing of their nuclear weapon as another nuclear
crisis. 31  While not diminishing the lessons of history, this
comment is concerned with the way North Korea's actions since
the IAEA's initial inspections in 1992 have highlighted the holes
in the non-proliferation regime.
At that time, the IAEA inspectors detected a discrepancy in the
levels of plutonium reportedly made and those actually present.
32
The safeguards agreement allowed the IAEA to ask to send special
inspectors to further investigate the origins of the reporting gap,
33
but North Korea denied them entry.
34
In 1993, the United States Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) made a controversial move when it provided the IAEA with
spy satellite photos that confirmed that North Korea had likely
reprocessed fuel.35  On May 11, 1993, the IAEA referred the
problem to the United Nations Security Council for action due to
North Korea's non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement.
36
(describing a heated exchange of gunfire at the DMZ just days after the nuclear test).
29 William J. Perry, Proliferation on the Peninsula: Five North Korean Nuclear
Crises, in 607 ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 78 (2006) (identifying a second
crises in 1990 when the reactor as Yongbyon was built with the help of the Russians, id.
at 80, the third crisis in 1994, id. at 81, the fourth crisis in 1998, when the North Koreans
tested long-range missiles, id. at 82, and the fifth crisis in 2002 when the North Koreans
restarted their nuclear program, id. at 83.).
30 See id. at 79.
31 See id. at 84-86.
32 See IAEA Factsheet, supra note 7; Perry, supra note 29, at 81.
33 See IAEA Factsheet, supra note 7.
34 See Perry supra note 29, at 81.
35 See Cumings, supra note 19, at 227.
36 See IAEA Factsheet, supra note 7.
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North Korea expelled the IAEA inspectors, dropped out of the
IAEA, and threatened to leave the NPT. 37 With North Korea well
on its way to becoming the rogue nuclear state everyone feared,
the United States quickly acted to negotiate the Agreed
Framework.38
The Agreed Framework provided that a consortium of
western states would give North Korea two modern nuclear
reactors in exchange for North Korea freezing its program and
allowing inspections. 39 Under the Agreed Framework the IAEA
was to monitor compliance, 40 but North Korea never returned to
the IAEA membership. 41 The situation then focused on North
Korea's ballistic missile capabilities for the next ten years.42
.During talks in October 2002,. North Korea confirmed it
had a clandestine nuclear program based on uranium fissile
material.43  The United States declared that North Korea was in
violation of the-Agreed Framework and they suspended shipment
of fuel that had been promised.44 In December 2002, North Korea
retaliated by lifting the freeze on its plutonium program and
expelling the IAEA inspectors that were monitoring the freeze.
45
The following month, North Korea announced its departure from
the NPT.46
37 See Perry, supra note 2.9, at 81.
38 See Agreed Framework Between the United States of America and the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, U.S.-N. Korea, Oct. 21, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 603
[hereinafter Agreed Framework].
39 See id., at part I. See generally, iHOMA S GRAHAM, DISARMAMENT SKETCHES
235 (2002) (describing the diplomatic efforts to achieve the Agreed Framework and the
author's firsthand belief that failure would have lead to nuclear war).
40 See Agreed Framework, supra note 38.
41 See IAEA Factsheet, supra note 7.
42 See Perry, supra note 29, at 82-83.
43 See John S. Park, Inside Multilateralism: The Six-Party Talks, 28 WASH. Q.,
Autumn 2005, at 75, 80.
44 See Perry, supra note 29, at 83-84.
45 See id. at 83-84. See, Jonathan Watts, UN Gives North Korea One Last Chance,
THE GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 7, 2003, at 11 (detailing the U.N.'s reaction to the
expulsion of the inspectors and threatening referral to the Security Council).
46 See Martin Regg Cohn, North Korea's Nuclear Gambit, TORONTO STAR (Can.),
Jan. 12, 2003, at Bl(noting North Korea's exit from the NPT and how it is congruent
with North Korea's history of not playing by the rules); N. Korea Withdraws From
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [Vol. XXXIII
The United States then proposed denuclearization at the
Six-Party Talks in 2004. 47  The fourth round of the Talks were
scheduled for October 2004, but North Korea refused to come to
the negotiating table citing what one news agency reported as "a
hostile climate created by the U.S.'48 By this time, estimates were
that North Korea had reprocessed enough fuel for anywhere from
three to six weapons.49 In an effort to gain bargaining leverage,
North Korea somewhat confirmed the estimates and announced
that it possessed nuclear weapons in February 2005.50 The parties
reconvened in July 200551 and agreed to a statement of principles
in which the United States was to give North Korea a light-water
reactor in exchange for North Korea coming back to the Six-Party
Talks and the NPT regime.52  North Korea refused to stop its
nuclear program until it received the light water reactor.53  The
situation was tense as states like Japan feared the missile and
nuclear capabilities of North Korea and the ineffectiveness of the
sanctions at the time.54
Nuclear Pact, BBC NEWS, Jan. 10, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/2644593.stm (last visited Sept. 23, 2007).
47 See Selig S. Harrison, Did North Korea Cheat?, 84 FOREIGN AFF. 99 (2005);
Seoul Admits Secret Uranium Trials, CNN, Sept. 3, 2004,
http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/asiapcf/09/02/skorea.nukes/index.html.
48 See Six-Party Talks on North Korean Nuclear Program Under Way, RIA
NovosTi (July 27, 2005), http://en.rian.ru/world/20050727/40980276.html (last visited
Sept. 4, 2007).
49 See JAMES L. SCHOFF ET AL., BUILDING SIX-PARTY CAPACITY FOR A WMD-FREE
KOREA 10 (2004).
50 See IAEA Factsheet, supra note 7.
51 See RIA NOvIsTi, supra note 48.
52 See Contemporary Practice of the US Relating to International Law: Use of
Force and Arms Control: U.S. and Other Powers Reach Tentative Understanding on
North Korea's Nuclear Program, 99 AM J. INT'L L. 914, 915(John R. Crook ed., 2005)
[hereinafter Tentative Understanding].
53 See id. at916.
54 Ex-Japan Diplomat Marks N. Korea Nukes, Missiles as 'Biggest Threat,' KYODO
NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 16, 2006, available at
http://findarticles.com/p/articIes/mi-mOXPQ/is_2006_Sept_18/ai_n 16729901 (quoting
Katsunari Suzuki, a former Japanese diplomat, as saying "but Kim Jong-il's
administration has yet to starve (due to economic assistance by China and South Korea).
That explains why North Korea doesn't show up at the six-party talks.").
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On October 9, 2006, North Korea tested a nuclear device
measured at less than a kiloton.55 As mentioned previously, world
leaders reacted with surprisingly uniform outrage, as even the
Chinese Ambassador to the United Nations admitted that North
Korea needed to be punished.'56 At the behest of a couple of its
members, the United Nations Security Council imposed sanctions
on North Korea which, among other things, froze foreign North
Korean bank accounts, mandated inspection of all transports in
and out of the country, and placed an embargo on luxury items and
things that could be used to develop its nuclear program.
57
China facilitated the resumption of the Six-Party Talks on
February 8, 2007.58 The talks resulted in the February 13th
Statement, in which the United States agreed to end trade
sanctions by taking North Korea off the list of state-sponsors of
terror in return for North Korea's complete shutdown of its nuclear
program.59 The February 13th Statement described a process by
which the objectives are to be met, and alas, the process of
managing North Korea's proliferation continues.
60
III. Did North Korea Break the Law?
A preliminary matter in determining if North Korea broke
any international laws by testing its nuclear device is to consider
the international regime barring nuclear testing. There are a
number of International Court of Justice cases, multilateral
treaties, and international agreements concerning nuclear
55 See Chanlett-Avery, supra note 25, at 1.
56 See Chinese Experts Comment on Situation After North Korean Nuclear Test,
RED ORBIT, Oct. 11, 2006, http://www.redorbit.com/news/international/
689535/chinese.experts comment_on_situation-afternorth_korean_nucleartest/index.
html (last visited Sept. 23, 2007).
57 See List of Sanctions Against North Korea, INDO-ASIAN NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 15,
2006, http://www.nerve.in.biological+weapon/news:25350016452 (last visited Sept. 23,
2007).
58 See Jim Yardley, North Korea and Others Set to Resume Nuclear Talks, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 8, 2007, at A13.
59 See Initial Action for the Implementation of the Joint Statement, available at Full
Text of Denuclearization Agreement, KOREAN TIMES, Feb. 13, 2007, available at
http://times.hankooki.comflpage/nation/200702/kt2007021320383011990.htm
[hereinafter February 13th Statement].
60 See id.
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technology, but the basis of the nuclear non-proliferation regime
remains the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
A. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 61
62came into force in 1970. It was created to keep states with
nuclear weapons from spreading the technology, and by doing so
keep states without the technology from acquiring it. The NPT is
expressly aware of the differences between "nuclear-weapon
states' 63 and "non-nuclear weapon states."64 To reach a consensus
broad enough to create an instrument of the breadth of the NPT,
the drafters had to assure non-nuclear weapons states that they
would benefit from joining the NPT. 65 The drafters lured the non-
nuclear weapon states into the treaty by offering security with
prospects of disarmament and promising that the new restrictions
would facilitate, rather than hinder, their own attempts to use
nuclear power.66 Additionally, in the Cold War setting, nuclear
powers like the United States offered protection by pledging to be
the second-strike force and return any nuclear attack on countries
like Japan and South Korea; this is known as the "nuclear
umbrella." 6
7
Article I of the NPT confronts proliferation by obliging
nuclear weapons states to agree not to transfer any nuclear
weapons devices or to "assist, encourage, or induce any non-
nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear
weapons." 68 Plainly Article I is aimed at preventing the spread of
61 NPT, supra note 8. GRAHAM, supra note 9, at 105.
62 GRAHAM, supra note 9, at 105.
63 See NPT, supra note 8, art. IX sec. 3 (defining nuclear weapons states as "one
which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive
device." NPT, supra note 8, art. IX sec. 3.
64 It is important to note the 'weapon' portion of this distinction, as some countries
may have nuclear power capabilities, but do not possess nuclear weapons.
65 See GRAHAM, supra note 9, at 103-05.
66 See generally id.
67 See Joseph S. Nye Jr., Editorial, Nonproliferation After North Korea, WASH.
POST, Nov. 5, 2006, at B7.
68 NPT, supra note 8, art. I.
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nuclear weapons. 69  All signs indicate that North Korea
manufactured its nuclear weapons in-country, meaning Article I is
likely inapplicable in North Korea's case.7 ° However, if Article I
is broadly construed, it could be used to hold any state that
inadvertently assisted the manufacture of nuclear weapons by the
insecurity of their own technology accountable for doing so.
However, it does not appear that any state has been held
accountable for aiding and abetting proliferation.
71
In Article II of the NPT, non-nuclear weapon states agree
not to attempt to obtain nuclear weapons or to manufacture their
own. 72  Notably absent from this section of the Treaty is a
prohibition on seeking knowledge about engineering a nuclear
device 73 North Korea's conduct appears to violation Article II
because, detonation of a nuclear weapon is, a clear indication that
North Korea, a named non-nuclear-weapon state, has somehow
"manufacture[d] or otherwise acquire[d] nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices.
74
If North Korea has violated the NPT by possessing a
nuclear device, the next logical question in determining if North
Korea has conclusively violated the NPT is how North Korea
acquired its nuclear materials and technology. If North Korea
somehow bought the materials and technology after it withdrew75
from the NPT, then it would not have technically violated Article
II of the NPT so long as it was no longer a party to the treaty at the
time the transaction occurred. However, many experts think it
unlikely that North Korea somehow just acquired nuclear weapons
69 Id.
70 See N. Korea Building Bombs, Its Envoy Says, L.A. TIMES, June 9, 2005, at A4;
David E. Sanger, North Korea Says It Has Made Fuel for Atom Bombs. See also N.Y.
TIMES, July 15, 2003, at Al.
71 See Doug Saunders, Test Puts Nuclear Salesman in Harsh Light, GLOBE & MAIL
(Canada), Oct. 11, 2006, at Al (implicating individuals, not states, in proliferation of
nuclear secrets). See also William J. Broad et al., As Nuclear Secrets Emerge, More Are
Suspected, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2004, at 1 (noting that North Korea, Libya, and Iran
were customers of Dr. A.Q. Khan, the Pakistani scientist accused of selling nuclear
technology, not accomplices).
72 NPT, supra note 8, art. II.
73 Id.
74 Id. art. II.
75 See Cohn, supra note 46.
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technology after it left the NPT.76  The consensus is that North
Korea has been steadily working on its program since the early
1990s77 after an amount of spent plutonium was reported missing
by the IAEA.78 If the consensus is correct, North Korea produced
its own raw materials and need only procure the technology from
an outside source. Many believe North Korea received the
technology through transactions with private actors, namely Dr.
Khan from Pakistan. 79  Dr. Khan developed Pakistan's nuclear
bomb and then went to several countries selling the technology; he
did not, however, provide the raw materials. 80
The NPT's sole focus on states as the keepers of nuclear
technology is arcane and creates a vast hole in the current non-
proliferation regime. A reasonably narrow reading of Article II
does not prohibit a state from "using the by-products of its civilian
nuclear program to manufacture weapons-grade uranium and
plutonium." 81 If this is the case, then the time when a state is
actually in violation of Article II is some time between acquiring
fissile material and detonating a bomb. Though the NPT is
intended to curtail proliferation, the plain language of the
agreement does not allow the international community to step in
until a state is a long way towards making actual weapons. 82 As a
result, many understand the current formulation of the NPT to be
functionally useless.
83
The NPT was drafted with two things in mind: (1) fear of
the danger of nuclear war and (2) understanding of the peaceful
76 See Sharon Squassoni, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: Latest Developments,
Congressional Research Service Report For Congress 3-4 (Oct. 18, 2006) (detailing that
North Korea has been reprocessing materials since the early 1990s).
77 Id. at 4 (quoting Secretary of State Colin Powell as saying "We now believe they
[North Koreans] have a couple of nuclear weapons and have had them for years" in Meet
the Press on Dec. 29, 2002.).
78 IAEA Factsheet, supra note 7.
79 Broad et al., supra note 71.
80 See id.
81 Helen H. Cousineau, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and Global Non-
Proliferation Regime: A U.S. Policy Agenda, 12 B.U. INT'L L.J. 407, 423 (1994).
82 Id.
83 See id. See also Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements,
99 AM J. INT'L L. 581, 585 (2005) (calling the NPT a "shallow" instrument).
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benefits of nuclear power.84  Article III is drafted to prevent a
peaceful nuclear power program from being converted into a
nuclear weapons program, 8 5 because there is no technical way to
limit the potential of nuclear materials to solely peaceful uses.
8 6
The solution offered by the NPT was to empower the IAEA to
monitor the nuclear programs of every country to prevent the use
of a peaceful program as a cover for a clandestine weapons
program. 87 In Article III, § 1 of the NPT states that all countries
will negotiate an individual system of safeguards with the IAEA
that allows for the "verification of the fulfillment of its obligations
assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of
nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons."
88
Furthermore, the NPT provides that "Non-nuclear-weapon States
Party to the Treaty [should] conclude agreements with the
[IAEA]. '' 89 Article III puts a special restriction on the transfer of
fissionable material to states that have not concluded a safeguards
agreement. 90 This highlights the inherent problem with the NPT:
the Treaty promotes the use and transfer of fissionable materials
for peaceful means, but then runs into trouble when those
materials are diverted for non-peaceful applications.
The NPT advocates the use of peaceful nuclear power. For
example, Article IV states that "nothing in this Treaty shall be
interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all Parties to the
Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy
for peaceful purposes." 91  Moreover, the NPT goes further to
actually mandate the spread of peaceful nuclear technology
between signatory states. 92 The flaw in this part of the NPT is
amplified by the North Korean situation. North Korea has most
84 NPT, supra note 8, preamble ("affirming the principle that the benefits of
peaceful applications of nuclear technology").
85 Id. art. III.
86 Thomas, supra note 10, at6.
87 IAEA Statute, supra note 18.
88 NPT, supra note 8, art. III sec. 1.
89 Id. art. III sec. 4.
90 Id."art. III sec. 2.
91 Id. art. IV sec. 1.
92 Id. art. IV sec. 2, art. V.
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likely made its weapons from the spent fuel reported missing by
the IAEA in the early 1990s.93 North Korea obtained the fuel to
make fissionable material from its peaceful domestic nuclear
program.94 Because many of the materials have duly peaceful and
bellicose uses, it is nearly impossible to facilitate the growth of a
non-nuclear weapon country's peaceful nuclear capabilities
without simultaneously advancing the threat that they become a
nuclear weapon state. Furthermore, as Thomas points out, the
development of nuclear propulsion systems is not covered by the
NPT.9
6
Article X of the NPT allows the parties to withdraw from
the Treaty with three months notice in the case of "extraordinary
events, related to the subject matter of [the] Treaty."97 Thomas
says that the exit provision "seems to contradict the whole purpose
of the NPT by providing an easy escape clause."98  The
"extraordinary events" standard provides something of a bar on
the sudden removal of a state from the Treaty; however, practice
indicates otherwise. North Korea flirted with exercising Article X
and withdrawing in March of 1994; that crisis resulted in the
Agreed Framework. 100 Finally in January 2003, North Korea
actually exercised its three-month notice and withdrew from the
NPT. l0 l Given its withdrawal, North Korea cannot be technically
bound by any of the provisions of the Treaty which it seemingly
broke.
The legal implications of dropping out of the NPT and then
specifically acting counter to it, by not only seeking but acquiring
nuclear weapons, is uncertain. Instead of relying on the provisions
of the Treaty to govern the violating member's conduct, the
93 See Squassoni, supra note 76.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 8.
96 Thomas, supra note 10, at 8-9.
97 NPT, supra note 8, art. X sec. 1.
98 Thomas, supra note 10, at 8.
99 Id. at 4 (noting that North Korea "may have been within its legal rights to invoke
Article X").
100 See infra text accompanying note 139.
10, North Korea Profile, Nuclear Threat Initiative, http://www.nti.org/e_research/
profiles/NK/index.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2007) [hereinafter NTI Profile].
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international community is left to act only under customary
international law. As Part 1I of this comment will explore,
leaving the legality of nuclear proliferation up to the general
practice of states opens up a number of holes in the regime. This
is true largely because public international law is based almost
completely on consent due to the prominence of state
sovereignty. 102 Accordingly, North Korea's withdrawal from the
NPT makes it nearly impossible to hold them accountable under
the terms of the NPT, as they have expressed their consent to no
longer, be bound. This begs the question: what if evidence comes
out that North Korea was in violation of the NPT before January
2003? Can North Korea then be held accountable for breaching
provisions of a treaty that it is not a party to at the time
enforcement is sought?
By exercising Article X of the NPT, North Korea has
highlighted a recurring theme throughout international law and
this comment. The consensual nature of international law presents
a tremendous hurdle for the non-proliferation regime and
specifically the effectiveness of the NPT. How can the NPT be a
successful non-proliferation tool when a state can merely opt out
once obtaining nuclear weapons better serves its own interests?
The NPT only seems to act as an indicator for determining
whether the proliferation status quo has been maintained with
reliance on the IAEA and the UN to monitor and effectuate
compliance.
In 1995, Pilat and Nakhleh commented on the NPT's
inability to deal with North Korea as a damning example of its
weakness when saying: "North Korea is a poverty-stricken state
with virtually no allies and few or no friends. Yet even in this
situation, the permanent members of the Security Council were not
willing to risk the mild stick of economic sanctions, let alone
resort to forcible measures.' 10 3 "The NPT contains inherently
102 See Oyvind 0sterud, Sovereign Statehood and National Self-Determination: A
World Order Dilemma, in SUBDUING SOVEREIGNTY: SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RIGHT TO
INTERVENE 18, 19 (Marianne Heiberg ed., 1994).
103 Joseph F. Pilat and Charles W. Nakhleh, A Treaty Reborn? The NPT After
Extension, in THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME 41, 52 (Raju G.C. Thomas ed.,
1998).
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weak language, ' 1°4 therefore a situation has to become relatively
serious before it requires action.
The NPT, as originally signed, was only to last 25 years,
105
but at the 1995 review conference it was renewed indefinitely.
10 6
Many of the limitations of the NPT were apparent at the 1995
review conference, but for political reasons, the NPT was renewed
without amendment. 
107
B. North Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA)
The IAEA was created as a part of the original idea of the
NPT - namely, that the gift of nuclear technology would be
deposited in an international organization that controls it
proliferation. 108 More specifically, Article III (B)(2) of the IAEA
Statute commands the IAEA to control fissionable material to
ensure it is only used for peaceful purposes. 1°9  The IAEA is
analogous to an American administrative agency, as it is charged
with helping all countries reap the benefits of peaceful nuclear
power while monitoring compliance to avoid further nuclear
weapons proliferation." l0  Article II of the IAEA Statute
specifically charges the organization to "accelerate and enlarge the
contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity
throughout the world," while assuring that atomic energy is not
used for any military purpose." 1 Though it still operates under its
dual role; but, as far as non-proliferation is concerned it is the
104 Cousineau, supra note 81, at 422-24.
105 NPT, supra note 8, art. X § 2.
106 Thomas, supra note 10, at 1. See also Cousineau, supra note 81, at 437 (arguing
that the NPT should have been renewed for set periods and that indefinite renewal means
it will never be strengthened).
107 See Thomas, supra note 10, at 1 (explaining that India had just stopped the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty from even getting a non-binding resolution out of the
UN General Assembly, therefore simply renewal of the NPT was valued over
comprehensive change).
108 NPT, supra note 8, art. IlI.
lo9 IAEA Statute, supra note 18, art. III (D)(2).
I 10 See generally id.
i' Id. art. II.
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IAEA's duty to monitor the nuclear programs in all signatory
countries that is of greatest concern.
The NPT requires all of the nations to negotiate and
conform with a "safeguards agreement" with the IAEA;
i 2
essentially this is an appraisal of safety regulations that must be
applied to the nuclear assets within a country. The IAEA
promulgates general regulations for the various kinds of nuclear
facilities and incorporates them into a specific safeguards
agreement for each country." 
3
The IAEA is charged with monitoring compliance with the
safeguards agreements to assure that the nuclear operation is
peaceful 114 and all safety regulations are being followed. 115 The
IAEA appoints inspectors who "shall have access at all times to all
places and data and to any person who by reason of his occupation
deals with materials, equipment, or facilities which are required by
this Statute to be safeguarded.' 116 Though Article XII(A)(6) does
note that the agreement of the country matters'' 7 and Article III(D)
commands the IAEA to respect state sovereignty, 118 the inspectors
have relatively unfettered access to nuclear facilities, records, and
personnel. 119 The IAEA includes this access as a provision of the
safeguards agreement, thus satisfying the assent provision of
Article XII(A)(6). 120 North Korea has expelled IAEA inspectors
on at least two occasions. One such time was in June 1994 only
to have them return to monitor as a part of the Agreed
Framework. 122  North Korea again expelled inspectors in
112 NPT, supra note 8, art. III.
13 IAEA Statute, supra note 18, art. III sec. A(5)-(6).
14 Id. art. XII sec. A(l).
115 Id. art. XII sec. A(2).
116 Id. art. XII sec. A(6).
17 Id.
118 Id. art. III sec. D.
119 IAEA Statute, supra note 18, art. XII(A)(6).
120 Id.
121 Perry, supra note 29, at 81; IAEA Factsheet, supra note 7.
122 Agreed Framework, supra note 38, § 1(3); See also IAEA Factsheet, supra note
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December 2002 upon deciding to restart its plutonium enrichment123
program.
Because of North Korea's rocky history with the IAEA,
there are still questions about their culpability under the IAEA
Statute. North Korea joined the IAEA in 1974. 12 In 1993, the
IAEA received satellite photos from the CIA from which officials
were able to determine that North Korea had reprocessed fuel, in
violation of its safeguards agreement as a non-nuclear weapon
state.125 This confrontation caused North Korea to withdraw from
126its membership in the IAEA on June 13, 1993. Although IAEA
inspectors did regain admission to North Korea under the 1994
Agreed Framework, as of now, North Korea has not rejoined the
IAEA. 1
27
The question then becomes similar to that of liability under
the NPT: Can North Korea be held in breach of their agreements
by testing the nuclear device at Gilju in 2006 if it was no longer
party to the IAEA treaty? Article XVIII(e) is the only IAEA
provision addressing withdrawal. It states, "[w]ithdrawal by a
member from the Agency shall not affect its contractual
obligations entered into pursuant to article XI or its budgetary
obligations for the year in which it withdraws." 128 It is a logical
stretch to interpret Article XVIII(e) as imposing a duty upon a
withdrawing state to conform with many of the IAEA's safeguards
as a contractual matter even though it is no longer actually a party
to the Treaty.129 Therefore, it seems that if North Korea is found
to have violated its obligations under Article XI, even after its
withdrawal, it ought to be and can be held liable for that violation.
123 Perry, supra note 29, at 83-84. See also NTI Profile, supra note 101.
124 IAEA Factsheet, supra note 7.
125 Cumings, supra note 19, at 226.
126 IAEA Factsheet, supra note 7.
127 Under the recently concluded agreement from the Six-Party Talks, North Korea
agrees to comply with their safeguards agreement and to rejoin the IAEA. However, a
healthy skepticism of this promise is warranted as North Korea promised the same in
thing in December 2002.
128 IAEA Statute, supra note 18, art. XVIII(e).
129 Id.
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Article XI addresses IAEA undertakings to help develop
peaceful nuclear technology and secure fissionable material. 3 ° In
order to prove that North Korea is liable for a violation under
Article XI by testing its nuclear arsenal, it must be established that
Article XI actually applies. In other words, it must be established
that North Korea's nuclear program started out as an official IAEA
project. 13 1 At present, it is difficult to discern whether this can be
proven. Presumably the fuel used in the bomb detonated in
October was the fuel North Korea has reprocessed since 1994.132
Under this assumption, North Korea's nuclear program would
likely qualify as an IAEA project due to the Agency's pre-1993
work with the country. 133 However, if the material came from
another party or a secret facility maintained without the help of the
IAEA, then it is unlikely to be found to be an IAEA project under
Article XI. 1
34
North Korea would also invariably challenge the
application of a Treaty provision after it had specifically
withdrawn from the Treaty. By the IAEA's own statute, any
dispute over the statute or its interpretation will then go to the
International Court of Justice.'
1 35
While few know the current status of North Korea's
nuclear program, it is clear that North Korea has been in violation
of the IAEA in some form since the early 1990s.136 As a result,
the nuclear test in October 2006 obviously confirms many of the
IAEA's previous contentions, but, because of North Korea's
withdrawal from the IAEA statute, it is unclear whether this law
would actually add another layer of culpability.
C. The Agreed Framework of 1994
Officially known as "The Agreed Framework Between the
United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic
130 Id. art. XI.
131 Id. art. XI(A).
32 See Chanlett-Avery, supra note 25.
133 IAEA Factsheet, supra note 7.
134 The safeguards agreement with North Korea applied only to the three sites. Id.
135 IAEA Statute, supra note 18, art. XVII sec. A.
136 See IAEA Factsheet, supra note 7.
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of Korea,"' 37 this agreement defused tensions in 1994 after North
Korea withdrew from the IAEA and threatened to withdraw from
the NPT. 138 The four articles of the Agreed Framework addressed
discrete problems. Article I provided that an international
consortium will give two light water reactors1 39 and alternative
energy sources in exchange for North Korea's freezing graphite-
motivated reactors.140  Article II emphasized "the full
normalization of political and economic relations."14' Article HI
supports cooperation with South Korea to ensure the
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, 142 and assures North
Korea that the United States will not attack with nuclear
weapons. 143 Finally, Article IV addressed the strengthening of the
non-proliferation regime, including that North Korea would
remain in the NPT144 and comply with IAEA Safeguards and
inspections after "a significant portion of the LWC [light water
reactor] project is completed."' 145
The Agreed Framework applied to the "5MW(e) reactor,
the Radiochemical Laboratory (reprocessing), the fuel fabrication
plant and the partially built 50 and 200MW(e) nuclear power
plants.' 46 The agreement allowed the IAEA to monitor spent fuel
and it was this monitoring that revealed that North Korea had
likely produced weapons-grade plutonium. 147  Because of the
inspections mandated by the Agreed Framework, the IAEA has
fifteen year old evidence showing that the fuel for the weapon that
was tested could have come from these facilities. North Korea has
137 Agreed Framework, supra note 38.
138 IAEA Factsheet, supra note 7.
139 For technical reasons, light water reactors make it hard to manufacture nuclear
weapons. NORTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR THREAT; Japan could build N-weapons, but...,
DAILY YOMIURI (Tokyo, Jap.), March 22, 2007 (describing how Japan's efforts to build a
bomb would be thwarted by their dependence on light water reactors).
140 Agreed Framework, supra note 38, art. I.
141 Id. art. II.
142 Id. art. 1I(2-3).
143 Id. art. 111(1).
144 Id. art. IV(l).
145 Id. art. IV (2) & (3).
146 IAEA Factsheet, supra note 6.
147 GRAHAM, supra note 9, at 1269.
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acknowledged its clandestine nuclear operation since 2002, but the
possibility remains that they still maintain other secretive other
nuclear facilities.1 48 Unfortunately, however, because the Agreed
Framework is so narrowly cabined in the types of facilities that are
within its bounds, North Korea may not have technically violated
it. A more important question is whether the international
consortium's failure to deliver on the terms of the agreement may
have somehow relieved North Korea of its obligations.
D. I.C.J. Decision on the Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons
By resolution, the General Assembly of the United Nations
certified a question to the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.)
requesting an advisory opinion on the legality of the use of nuclear
weapons. 149 The I.C.J. surveyed international law to determine
whether the use, or threatened use, of nuclear weapons is
specifically allowed or prohibited. 
150
The term "use" would have to be very broadly construed
for it to cover the testing of a nuclear weapon. The Court
mentions various international agreements controlling the
acquisition of nuclear weapons, however it mainly focuses on the
use, or threatened use, of nuclear weapons in an armed conflict. 151
Even though the United States and North Korea are still at war
because a peace treaty ending the Korean War has not been
signed,152 it would be a very tenuous claim to say that the testing
of a nuclear weapon constitutes "use" in an armed conflict.
The I.C.J. interpreted Article 2 paragraph 4 of the U.N.
Charter 153 and determined that "it would be illegal for a State to
threaten force to secure territory from another State, or to cause it
148 See Perry, supra note 29, at 83.
149 G.A. res. 49/75, K, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/75 (Dec. 15, 1994).
i5o Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226 (July 8).
151 See id.
152 Harrison, supra note 47, at 99.
153 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (reading "All Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations.").
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to follow or not follow certain political or economic paths."'' 54
William Perry has identified a trend in North Korea's behavior:
the beleaguered nation threatens to keep its nuclear program going
every four year to correspond with the midterm elections in the
United States.' 55 It has become standard operating procedure to
placate North Korea with aid and fuel in hopes of exercising some
level of control over the State's conduct. 156 The United States has
been complicit in buying off North Korea's good behavior for
years, 157 but under the I.C.J.'s ruling, the inherent threat of North
Korea's possession or use of nuclear weapons could be enough to
violate international law.158  This is true because the I.C.J. has
acknowledged the argument that possession of nuclear weapons
"may indeed justify an inference of preparedness to use them." 159
If North Korea's test does not constitute "use" then could it
possibly be a "threat?" North Korea's leadership has said it would
use nuclear weapons defensively in the case of an external
attack. 16  It is difficult to sustain the argument that mere
possession of the weapons is a distinct threat because there is no
immediacy, and no single country is squarely in the crosshairs.
Furthermore, it is unlikely that any entity would enforce the notion
that it is unlawful for a nation to state its intent to respond to a
nuclear strike with a reciprocal nuclear strike. This is the principle
underlying the doctrine of mutually assured destruction and the
bases of the United States' promise to defend South Korea and
Japan with nuclear weapons if necessary. 161 It is highly unlikely
that North Korea's domestic subterranean test of its nuclear
154 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 142.
155 Perry, supra note 28, at 78.
156 Id. at 83.
157 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 150, at 83.
158 Id. at 246-47.
159 Id. at 246.
160 Richard Sisk, World Trembles as Despot Goes Ballistic, North Korea Unleashes
Blast and Could Hit Button on a Second, DAILY NEWS (New York), Oct. 10, 2006, at 7
(quoting North Korean Ambassador Pak Gil Yon as saying that the nuclear tests afford
his country "a powerful, self-reliant defense capability to counter any U.S. threat").
161 Kwan Wing Kin, US Vows to Protect Allies Against N. Korea, STRAITS TIMES
(Singapore), Oct. 19, 2006.
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arsenal -would be considered the kind of use or threat that is
addressed in this case.
The I.C.J. recognizes the importance of international
disarmament, but it specifically refuses to acknowledge that
simply possessing nuclear weapons is illegal. 162 The I.C.J. likens
nuclear weapons to ,weapons of mass destruction, which it
recognizes have been outlawed in specific multi-lateral
instruments. 163 It then notes that no specific instrument has been
adopted to outlaw the possession of nuclear weapons.' 64  The
Court notes that the discriminatory nature of the NPT accepts the
possession of nuclear weapons by the states, and therefore cannot
be seen as criminalizing their possession. However, the Court
notes that this reading is contrary to the disarmament provisions of
the NPT.165 The Court unanimously ruled that "there exists an
obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion
negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects
under strict and effective international control."'' 66  Under this
logic, a case could likely be made that North Korea, by acquiring
nuclear weapons, has acted counter to its obligation to act in good
faith to disarm. This would be a rather tenuous claim as the
current climate for nuclear disarmament has soured. The stall in
disarmament defeats the likelihood that North Korea can be held
accountable under this line of logic for two reasons: (1) the
general practice of states militates against this interpretation of the
NPT, and (2) instituting actions of this sort work against the
interests of nuclear weapons states.
North Korea has repeatedly asserted that it was, developing
nuclear weapons to thwart an American attack. 67  The I.C.J.
narrowly supports the possible use of nuclear weapons in self-
defense. It has ruled that:
162 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 142 at 252.
163 Id. at 248.
164 Id. at 249 (noting that though there have been some specific instruments there
have not been any broadly adopted agreements like the other prohibitions on weapons of
mass destruction).
165 Id. at 263.
166 Id. at 267.
167 See Frank Ching, Giving Pyongyang the Bomb, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST
(China), Dec. 14, 2006 at 18; Sisk, supra note 160.
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...the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally
be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in
armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules
of humanitarian law; However, in view of the current
state of international law, and of the elements of fact at
its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively
whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be
lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-
defen[s]e, in which the very survival of a State would be
at stake...1
68
Essentially, the I.C.J. recognizes that because the NPT allows
certain countries to possess nuclear weapons, it seems that there
must be some instances where they could be used and thus,
international law likely does not wholly outlaw the threat or use of
nuclear weapons.' 
69
Another concern is the limited precedential value of an
advisory opinion. 170 Technically, advisory opinions are, by their
nature, non-binding. These opinions can only be made binding by
a separate agreement.' 71 However, if it is the United Nations
General Assembly that commissioned the advisory opinion, a case
can be made that it has precedential value because the General
Assembly is comprised of many nations. 172 In reality, the Court
would likely follow the advisory opinion, but it could find the
opinion to have limited application.
Another factor to consider when assessing the applicability
of I.C.J. case law as precedent is the Preamble of the 1907 Hague
Convention IV known as the Martens Clause. 173 This Clause has
been summarized to say that "in a situation not specifically
covered by treaty, belligerents and others remain under protection
of the rule of the principles of law of nations, as they result from
the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of
168 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 150, at 266.
169 Id. at 253.
170 SHABTAI ROSENNE, ROSENNE'S THE WORLD COURT: WHAT IT IS AND How IT
WORKS 83 (Terry D. Gill et. al, 5th ed., 1995).
171 Id. at 256.
172 U.N. Charter, supra note 153, art. 9.
173 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
preamble, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 619.
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humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience." 174 Therefore,
should North Korea be brought to the I.C.J. to be held accountable
for testing a nuclear weapon, it would not only be held to the letter
of their agreements but also to the general practice of states.
Given this, the I.C.J.'s advisory opinion can be applied to North
Korea to the extent that it represents a comprehensive review of
both statuftory and customary international law regarding the use
or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Assuming the advisory
opinion on the Legality of the Use or Threatened Use of Nuclear
Weapons represents an international consensus, it can be applied
as an expression of customary international law which indicates
that there is no general trend holding that the use of nuclear
weapons is per se prohibited and that nuclear weapons may legally
be used in extreme instances of self-defense. 
175
The United States specifically rejected this expanded
reading of the Martens Clause, taking the position that there is no
rule against the use of nuclear weapons. 176 The United States said
that the Martens Clause "does not independently establish the
illegality of nuclear weapons, nor does it transform public opinion
into rules of customary international law."' 177 Under the approach
taken by the United States, it is nearly impossible to apply the
Martens Clause and thus apply customary international law, and
conclude that North Korea has acted unlawfully by testing a
nuclear weapon.
This may be a completely tenable position for other areas
of international law, but it has limited application as applied to
nuclear- proliferation. The Martens Clause could be applied to
keep North Korea from skirting international law by withdrawing
from and acting just outside the bounds of the NPT, but the United
States' position specifically limits the Clause to treaty
interpretation. If the NPT is the treaty in question then it cannot
174 CHARLES J. MOXLEY, JR., NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE
POST COLD WAR WORLD, 123 (2000) (quoting an I.C.J. Hearing from Nov. 15, 1995).
175 This is known as the 'rule of necessity.' See id. at 124-25.
176 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion Verbatim
Record, 1996 I.C.J. 78-80 (Nov. 15, 1995), available at http://www.I.C.J.-
cij.org/I.C.J.www/icases/iunan/iunancr/iUNANiCR9534_19951115.PDF (last visited
Sept. 23, 2007) [hereinafter Hearings].
177 Id. at 78.
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apply because North Korea has specifically withdrawn from it.178
This is problematic because the other agreements that would tend
to prohibit North Korea from having nuclear weapons are not
treaties. The expanded reading of the Martens Clause incorporates
public reaction to international law so that if a large number of
states think an action is illegal, then it becomes illegal. Though
the narrow reading advocated by the United States may protect the
rights of minority states in some instances, it has no place in the
case of nuclear proliferation where the stakes are much higher.
But this point, while technically interesting, may not actually be
significant or even relevant because in any instance where there is
a wide consensus that an action is illegal, states alleging the
violation can simply approach the UN General, Assembly or
Security Council with their grievances.
E. Nuclear Tests Cases and the Principle of Good Faith
The common law method of assessing legality is to find an
analogous case and couch your decision on the precedential value
of the previous decision. North Korea is not the first country to
test a nuclear device nor would it be the first state hauled before
the International Court of Justice for conducting such a test. In
1974, New Zealand and Australia took France to the I.C.J. in
separate actions seeking to stop nuclear testing in the Southern
Pacific Ocean.1 79  France had informed the countries that it
intended to stop atmospheric tests, and New Zealand and Australia
wanted an assurance that further testing would not occur. 180
The cases did not reach the question of whether nuclear testing, in
and of itself, is against international law. 181 The Court did note
that New Zealand and Australia had causes of action because there
was some modicum of radioactive fallout from the atmospheric
tests over the ocean upon the territories and waters of those
178 This has interesting implications if North Korea is going to comply with the new
agreement which requires them to rejoin the NPT. Further, the question remains as to
what happens when North Korea resigns a treaty it has already broken.
179 Nuclear Tests Case (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 457 (Dec. 20); Nuclear Tests Case
(Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253 (Dec. 20).
180 Nuclear Tests Cases, supra note 182.
181 Though this is an adversarial case, France objected to jurisdiction and did not
appear. Nuclear Test Case (Austl. v. Fr.), supra note 179, at 256.
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states.' The test North Korea conducted is distinguishable
because it was subterranean.' 83 Further, North Korea's test isn't
even in violation of what is known colloquially as the "Partial Test
Ban Treaty. ' 84 However, the Nuclear Tests Cases do reveal the
alternative theory of 'good faith' which could apply to North
Korea.
The I.C.J. noted that the theory of good faith is "one of the
basic principles governing the creation and performance of legal
options, whatever their source." 185  Read another way, the
principle of good faith holds that once a legal obligation is created,
states have a good faith responsibility to carry them out. The
Nuclear Tests Cases identify a legal duty that requires a state to
keep its promises so that "interested States may... place confidence
in them."'186  The rationale for the principle of good faith is
simple-states should be able to put credence in what other states
say they will do. The actual enforceable legal principle of good
faith comes from promissory estoppel, in which a country relies to
its detriment on the promises of another country.
The, simplest form of the principle -of good faith is
exhibited when the heads of two states exchange promises. The
states are now: obligated to perform their obligations to the best of
their ability. The I.C.J. broadened the principle of good faith in
the Nuclear Tests Cases when it commented on "the binding
character of an international obligation assumed by unilateral
declaration."l. 7 In the case of a unilateral declaration, a head of
state - or other agent or organ of the state with the power to bind
the state - makes an announcement of the state's intent to do
something and, by doing so, creates a reasonable reliance among
the members of the international community that it will honor that
pledge. Later in the opinion, the Court clearly held that the
principle applies to truly unilateral declarations by stating that "to
182 Nuclear Tests Case (N.Z. v. Fr.), supra note 179, at 475.
183 Johnson, supra note 1.
184 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space And
Under Water, Oct. 10, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 480 U.N.T.S. 43.
185 Nuclear Tests Case (N.Z. v. Fr.), supra note 179, at 473.
186 Id. at 473.
187 Id. •
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have legal effect, there is no need for these statements to be
addressed to a particular State, nor [is] acceptance by any other
State required."
Under this framework, to derive a legal right of reliance
from a unilateral declaration under the doctrine of good faith, the
promising country must: (1) make a declaration, (2) which
represents its clear intention, (3) to limit its own ability to act.' 89
The Court limited the application in one respect: statements made
in negotiation of an agreement are exempt from the doctrine.1 90
The very nature of negotiations would be undercut if the good
faith principle was read so as to immediately bind to terms once a
state announced them. In applying the principle of good faith to
the Nuclear Tests cases, the I.C.J. found that by making statements
orally and in correspondence, France was bound to stop its nuclear
tests in 1974.191
Applying the principle of good faith to the North Korean
nuclear test would initially seem to give rise to an action for
promissory estoppel because North Korea has indicated its intent
to refrain from obtaining or testing nuclear weapons on numerous
occasions. 192 In concluding the 1994 Agreed Framework with the
United States, North Korea agreed to freeze its nuclear program. 193
Testing a nuclear device would indicate that North Korea had
violated its declaration to freeze its nuclear programs. But, this is
not necessarily true if North Korea had already created its nuclear
arsenal by 1994, which is a possibility according to former
Secretary of State Colin Powell. 194  Additionally, North Korea
made it clear that it was removing the freeze and re-starting its
nuclear program in December 2002.195 Does this specific
acknowledgement of its intent to act violate the Agreed
188 Id. at 474.
189 Id. at 472.
190 Nuclear Tests Case (N.Z. v. Fr.), supra note 179, at 476.
191 Id. at 474-75.
192 See NPT, supra note 8; Agreed Framework, supra note 38; February 13th
Agreement, supra note 59.
193 Agreed Framework, supra note 38, art. 1(3) & art. IV.
194 See Squassoni, supra note 76.
195 NTI Profile, supra note 101.
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Framework of 1994 act contrary to good faith or does it conform
to it?
The initial reading would support the idea that by
unfreezing its program, North Korea was specifically acting
against its good faith obligation to fulfill the Agreed Framework.
The United States asserted that it was a breach. 196 However, the
Agreed Framework is an agreement and not a treaty, meaning the
application of the rules that of treaty interpretation is more
ambiguous. 197 This does not render the doctrine of good faith
inapplicable because as the Court in the Nuclear Tests Cases
notes, the principle applies to legal obligations "whatever their
source."' 198 But the application of the principle of good faith to
North Korea's obligations under the Agreed Framework does raise
questions about the limits of the doctrine. Does an agreement like
the Agreed Framework, without a clause for the termination of the
agreement, when coupled with the principle of good faith bind
North Korea in compliance for perpetuity? Or in the alternative,
can North Korea comply with the principle of good faith by
changing its intentions and making a completely new declaration -
in this case that it will unfreeze its nuclear program?
There is a more recent instance where good faith could be
applied to find North Korean liability. In September 2005, after
North Korea announced that it had manufactured a nuclear
weapon, North Korea and the United States issued a statement that
they had reached a deal pursuant to which North Korea agreed to
rejoin Six-Party Talks, rejoin the NPT, and to comply with IAEA
Safeguards. 199 However, the next day, North Korea clarified its
position by stating that it would not honor the agreement until it
received the light water reactor promised by the United States in
return for their compliance.2 00 One year later, North Korea tested
its nuclear device. Is this a violation of North Korea's good
faith duty to honor its joint statement with the United States? Or
196 Harrison, supra note 47.
197 GRAHAM, supra note 9, at 1268.
198 Nuclear Tests Case (N.Z. v. Fr.), supra note 179, at 473.
199 NTI Profile, supra note 101.
200 Tentative Understanding, supra note 52, at 916.
201 Johnson, supra note 1.
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
does North Korea's noncompliance indicate that the agreement
was tentative and fell apart on the particulars? Recall that the
doctrine of good faith does not apply to statements made in
negotiations.
20 2
Did the western consortium breach the agreement by not
providing the light-water reactor in a timely fashion? If so, the
breach of the Agreement occurred before North Korean breached
its own obligations in retaliation. If the other parties breached
first, holding North Korea accountable under the good-faith theory
is much harder because good-faith was already breached by the
other party.
North Korea has said multiple times that it would abandon
its nuclear program. Through its failure to disarm, North Korea
has violated the principle of good faith set forth in the Nuclear
Tests Cases. The holding in those cases is integral to any attempt
to hold North Korea accountable for the nuclear tests based on the
doctrine of good faith and their previous promises to disarm.
Secondly, the Nuclear Tests Cases represent an instance in which
the I.C.J. delivered a ruling on liability for nuclear testing despite
one party being absent and objecting to jurisdiction.203 The case
against North Korea is not iron clad because of the limits of the
good faith doctrine in circumstances where a state repeatedly
changes its stances and intentions. Enforcement is also a thorny
issue because it is unclear what kind of recourse would result from
a breach of good faith.
The explicit provisions of the February 13th Agreement
show that the parties understand the relative weakness of 'good
faith.' In the February 13th Agreement, the parties did not leave
as many things up to good faith execution as in previous
agreements. In the new agreement, the parties describe the
incremental irreversible shutdown of North Korea's nuclear
204program with specific deadlines. The six parties are, given
history, rightfully reticent about North Korea's ability to fulfill any
long-term commitments. At the time of writing this comment, the
202 See Nuclear Tests Case (N.Z. v. Fr.), supra note 179, at 476.
203 Id. at 460. This aspect will be discussed again below in the section on means of
enforcement. See infra text accompanying notes 218-75.
204 February 13th Statement, supra note 59.
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talks were resuming after they were threatened with issues over
unfreezing North Korean funds.
20 5
F. North-South Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula
In 1992, North Korea and the Republic of Korea (South
Korea) declared their joint resolve to "eliminate the danger of
nuclear war through denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
'
"
20 6
The North-South Joint Declaration contains a specific promise
from both states to not test or manufacture nuclear weapons.
20 7
Through application of a collateral theory - the good faith
obligation to abide by unilateral declarations that limit a State's
actions - the Declaration would be explicitly defied by testing a
nuclear weapon.
Two questions arise: (1) is the declaration is still valid and
(2) do the legal rights derived from it give rise to an actionable
claim? It is obvious that South Korea and the United States
believe that the declaration is still binding, as they have made
compliance with the promises therein a stipulation of the new
agreement. 208  The question then becomes what kind of legal
rights and remedies are available to South Korea. Like many of
the other agreements discussed, the matter would likely have to be
referred to the International Court of Justice or some other dispute
resolution body provided for in Article 33 of the UN Charter.
Given the nature of the conflict and the provisions of the UN
Charter, generally, and Article 33, specifically, it is highly
unlikely that South Korea can force North Korea to comply. It is
clear that the declaration gives each country the right to be free of
nuclear threat from the other; the remedy it provides if this right is
infringed is less clear. Moreover, assuming a remedy is available,
can South Korea show it has been damaged by North Korea's
breach? In the Nuclear Tests Cases, New Zealand and Australia
were able to show that there was tangible injury from nuclear
205 Maureen Fan, Deal on Funds Removes Hurdle to N. Korea Talks, WASH. POST,
Mar. 19, 2007, at A09.
206 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, N. Korea-S.
Korea, Jan. 20, 1992, 33 I.L.M 569 [hereinafter the North-South Joint Declaration].
207 Id. at Part 1.
2o8 February 13th Statement, supra note 59.
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fallout; here, the injury here is more amorphous. 209 South Korea
would have to sue on the right to be free from the threat of nuclear
weapons from North Korea. Given that the two are still
technically still at war, as the Korean War is only at a ceasefire,
210
this threat is relatively tangible, but the form of damages to be
awarded is much less clear. Under the aforementioned principle
of good-faith, North Korea has the obligation to comply with the
North-South Joint Declaration, 2 11 but in not exercising good faith
can it be compelled to do so or can monetary damages be
somehow assessed? The I.C.J. can refer the matter to the United
Nations Security Council, but, as referenced later, this is highly
unlikely.
212
Because North Korea has withdrawn from the NPT and the
IAEA, the likelihood it could be held in violation of either
agreement is minimal. North Korea is in blatant violation of its
Safeguards Agreement and the North-South Joint Declaration on
213Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. There also seems to
be a general breach of the good-faith duty not to proliferate that
North Korea undertook by repeatedly promising to shutdown its
program and forego the development of nuclear weapons. But no
matter how weak or strong the legal argument for holding North
Korea culpable is, it becomes moot if the nature of international
law makes enforcement impossible.
IV. Who Enforces the Law?
After determining that there are some legal theories - albeit
fewer than it would first appear - under which North Korea can be
held accountable for its nuclear weapon test, the focus turns to
who can make a determination that North Korea has violated
international law and then takes measures to enforce the law.
Valid enforcement of international law is based on consensus-
building. Given the dire need for enforcement of the law of
209 See Nuclear Test Case (Austl. v. Fr.), supra note 179, at 258; Nuclear Tests Case
(N.Z. v. Fr.), supra note 179, at 462.
210 See generally Military Armistice in Korea and Temporary Supplemental
Agreement, July 27, 1953, 4 U.S.T. 230, T.I.A.S. 2782.
211 See supra text accompanying note 206.
212 See infra text accompanying note 250.
213 See supra text accompanying note 206.
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nuclear non-proliferation, not just any coalition, but an expedient
and effective one, is required. This section is devoted to the
question of who can hold North Korea accountable for the
breaches of international law that were discussed in the previous
section.
A. The International Atomic Energy Agency
The IAEA, like a government agency in the United States,
is charged with the general administration of its area of the law but
it must look elsewhere to enforce its determinations. Coming
from Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" speech,214 the IAEA was
founded in 1957 and has a secretariat, a Board of Governors, and a
team of inspectors which are authorized to adopt safeguards and
monitor compliance.
215
There are only a couple of minor actions that the IAEA
can, of its own volition, take against violating states of its own
volition. These actions are mainly limited to the suspension of
IAEA membership privileges. 216 The harshest penalty the IAEA
can impose by itself is reserved for a repeated violated as set forth
in Article XIX(b).
A member which has persistently violated the
provisions of this Statute or of any agreement entered
into by it pursuant to this Statute may be suspended
from the exercise of the privileges and rights of
membership by the General Conference acting by a two-
thirds majority of the members present and voting upon
recommendation by the Board of Governors.
2 17
The IAEA is charged with monitoring compliance and
fostering cooperation, but its only explicit means of enforcement
comes from its duty to submit reports to the United Nations
218General Assembly and the Security Council. Upon submission
214 IAEA.org, History of the IAEA, http://www.iaea.org/About/
history.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2007).
215 Id.
216 IAEA Statute, supra note 18, art. XIX.
217 Id. art. XIX(b).
218 Id. art. III(B)(4).
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of its reports, actual enforcement is conducted by the United
Nations. 2
19
The implications of the lack of expedience and power to
address breaches of Safeguard Agreements are quite detrimental to
the effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime. On two separate
occasions, the IAEA has determined that North Korea was in
violation of its safeguards. The first time occurred in 1992, when,
after inspecting North Korea facilities, the IAEA detected a
discrepancy in the amount of material declared and the amount
produced by the search. 22  From this discrepancy, the IAEA
determined that North Korea had likely been trying to reprocess
spent fuel in order to create materials needed to develop a nuclear
weapon. In February 1993, the IAEA Board of Governors passed
a resolution demanding that North Korea allow special inspections
of the two sites they suspected of housing the clandestine nuclear
program - which it would confirm nine years later. 221  This
resolution infuriated North Korea, who then threatened to
withdraw from the NPT, citing, among other reasons, that the
IAEA was violating North Korea's sovereignty at the behest of the
United States. 222 This exemplifies a critical weakness in the non-
proliferation regime and a central question of international legal
enforcement in general: how can international legal enforcement
continue to respect state sovereignty while assuring compliance
with crucial safety agreements such as the NPT?
Respect for state sovereignty originated with the creation
of the nation-state, specifically, in the Treaty of Westphalia.
223
Osterud describes sovereignty as having a substantive component
which allows "the authorities of each state to be their own master,"
and formal a component that "demands freedom from outside
219 Id.
220 IAEA Factsheet, supra note 7.
221 Id. (noting the October 2002 announcement that North Korea has nuclear
weapons).
222 See Perry, supra note 29.
223 Treaty of Westphalia: Peace Treaty Between the Holy Roman Emperor and the
King of France and Their Respective Allies, Oct. 24, 1648, available at
http://fletcher.tufts.edu/multi/texts/historical/westphalia.txt (last visited Sept. 24, 2007).
The treaty ending the Thirty Year's War is commonly credited with creating the current
international system because it emboldened the idea of a sovereign nation-state. Id.
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interference." 224  International law is completely consent based
because of the doctrine of state sovereignty. Most of the major
foundational documents of international law acknowledge the
centrality of sovereignty and consent. 226  Most centrally, the
United Nations Charter bases its organization on "the sovereign
equality of all its Members. ',227 The Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations or
Between International Organizations recognizes the "consensual
nature of treaties and their ever-increasing importance as a source
of international law." 228 The Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties describes how a state can consent to be bound by a treaty
and by so doing cede a sliver of its sovereign immunity away in
the sense that a state agrees to act in a certain way.229
The unanswered question is what happens when a state
explicitly expresses its consent to no longer be bound, as North
Korea has done several times. 230 North Korea manifested its
intent to no longer be subject to the LAEA through its withdrawal
in 1994 - though later consented to IAEA monitoring in the
231Agreed Framework. More recently, North Korea withdrew
from the NPT, and by testing a nuclear weapon, acted specifically
against the aims, if not the letter, of the NPT.232 There is nothing
within the governing documents of the IAEA to prevent a state
from using its JAEA membership to gain peaceful nuclear
technology and then opt out of the organization when the state
wants to utilize the technology to create a nuclear weapon. As
mentioned earlier, the IAEA then can suspend its assistance, but in
regards to proliferation, this punishment is essentially moot.
224 Osterud, supra note 102, at 19.
225 See id. at 18-23.
226 Id.
227 U.N. Charter, supra note 154, art. 2, para. 1.
228 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International
Organizations or Between International Organizations preamble, Mar. 21, 1986, 25
I.L.M. 543.
229 Id. art. 1 1-17.
230 North Korea has done this by dropping out of the NPT and the IAEA and then
specifically acting against those treaties. See generally IAEA Factsheet, supra note 7.
231 Agreed Framework, supra note 38, at 605.
232 See supra sec. 111(a).
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Disputes under the IAEA statute are referred by statute to the
International Court of Justice. 233 Finally, the IAEA can submit its
234reports to the UN General Assembly or Security Council. After
further review, it will be obvious that the impetus for enforcement
falls almost solely on the Security Council. This makes the means
of finding culpability duplicative, and essentially dependent upon
the whim of the Security Council.235
B. The International Court of Justice
The International Court of Justice, as the "principal judicial
organ of the United Nations, ' 236 is the court of last resort for states
to settle disputes over international law and treaty construction.
237
As previously mentioned, there are several instances when the
International Court of Justice can rule on the substantive law of a
particular non-proliferation treaty. Disputes over the IAEA
Statute, for example, are settled in the I.C.J.238 Furthermore, the
I.C.J. would likely be the forum for any charge of breaching an
international agreement such as the North-South Joint Declaration
on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the 1994 Agreed
Framework, or the newly signed deal which gives North Korea
fuel for destroying its manufacturing capabilities.
In the Nuclear Tests Cases, the French challenged the
jurisdiction of the Court to hear such cases when one party fails to
appear. The Court clarified its jurisdiction and role by saying the
following:
.. the Court possesses an inherent jurisdiction enabling it
to take such action as may be required, on the one hand
to ensure that the exercise of its jurisdiction over the
merits, if and when established, shall not be frustrated,
and on the other, to provide for the orderly settlement of
all matters in dispute... 239
233 IAEA Statute, supra note 17, art. XIX(b).
234 Id. art. XI(c).
235 See infra sec. IV(c).
236 U.N. Charter, supra note 154, at art. 92.
237 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 34(1), Jun. 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1031 [hereinafter I.C.J. Statute].
238 IAEA Statute, supra note 18, art. XVII(A).
239 Nuclear Tests Case (Austl. v. Fr.), supra note 179, at 259.
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The I.C.J.'s jurisdiction is essentially as wide as discretion will
allow provided the interested parties are states.24 °  The
International Court of Justice will undertake treaty interpretation
and application of customary international law to make a
determination. But getting a verdict is merely half of the job, as
the judgment must then be enforced. As a part of the United
Nations, most states are party to the I.C.J. Statute and thus the
rulings of the Court are honored as a matter of comity.
241
However, there is nothing compelling states to honor I.C.J.
judgments for the same consent and sovereignty reasons
previously mentioned about the IAEA. 242 Article 94 of the UN
Charter indicates that United Nations members "under[take] to
comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in
any case to which it is a party."2 43 Though, admittedly, the matter
would likely have to be of supreme significance for a country to
thwart the structure of the United Nations and be willing to suffer
the consequences. Although it would be terrible policy to bypass
the U.N., there is still nothing compelling compliance.
Functionally, however, the I.C.J. rarely has a party succeed
in appealing to the Security Council for enforcement of one of its
244
rulings, as it is empowered to do under Article 94(2). Many
member countries only look to the I.C.J. when it suits them.
Recently the United States Supreme Court weakened the I.C.J.'s
expanse in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, where it said that the I.C.J.
has no stare decisis value.245  Though entrenched within the
United Nations, the position of the I.C.J. is still uncertain, making
the responsibility for assessing nuclear liability in a body of
suspect reach at least somewhat untenable. Furthermore, the idea
that the I.C.J. can uniformly create some sort of customary
international nuclear proliferation law is quite doubtful. With the
inherently weak and inconsistent language of the NPT, and the
240 See generally I.C.J. Statute, supra note 237, art. 34-48.
241 See id.
242 See supra sec. IV(a).
243 U.N. Charter, supra note 154, art. 94(1).
244 See generally DAVID SCHWEIGMAN, THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE UN CHARTER: LEGAL LIMITS AND THE ROLE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (2001).
245 Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 2669, 2684 (2006).
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limited res judicata effect of the I.C.J., as noted by Rosenne in his
treatise on the World Court, it seems very unlikely that the I.C.J. is
the first place to turn when wanting to address a breach of
international non-proliferation agreements. 246
C. The United Nations Security Council
In order to properly delve into effectiveness of the UN
Security Council as an enforcement mechanism, a short
exploration of the source of the Council's power is necessary.
Article 7 of the United Nations Charter creates six principal
organs, 247 of which the Security Council is decidedly the most
powerful. The Council's power comes from its ability to act with
the full force of all the members of the United Nations when it
comes to "the maintenance of international peace and security.
' 248
The actions of the Council do not have to be submitted to any
other organ for approval and the United Nations members have
specifically rejected revisions that would give other organs more
oversight.249  Article 25 of the UN Charter states that "the
Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the
decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present
Charter." 250 Schweigman notes that the power of the Security
Council came as a lesson of the past, concluding that "the drafters
of the Charter were cautious to avoid charging another toothless
organ as the League [of Nations] Council had been, with the
supervision of international peace and security.
'251
The strength and validity of the executive powers of the
Security Council become immediately relevant during a nuclear
crisis. The Security Council was designed to address this kind of
case swiftly. The Security Council can be directly implicated
when (1) the IAEA comes to it with a report of breach of a
246 ROSENNE, supra note 172, at 129.
247 In addition to the Security Council, these organs are: the International Court of
Justice, the Economic and Social Council, the Secretariat, and the Trusteeship Council.
U.N. Charter, supra note 154, art. 7.
248 Id. art. 24.
249 See SCHWEIGMAN, supra note 244, at 27-28.
250 U.N. Charter, supra note 154, art. 25.
251 SCHWEIGMAN, supra note 244, at 31.
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Safeguards Agreement or (2) a party to an I.C.J. judgment comes
forward seeking enforcement.
The Security Council responded quickly to North Korea's
nuclear test by unanimously adopting Resolution 1718 which
condemned the nuclear test, demanded that North Korea return to
the NPT and Six-Party Talks, froze some funds going in and out of
the country, and froze the import and export of some luxury goods
252from the country. Each member of the Security Council
denounced North Korea's nuclear test, and, to the Security
Council's credit, the pressure has led to the current agreement with
North Korea in which it has agreed to irreversibly dismantle its
nuclear program in return for fuel.253 However, if nuclear weapon
proliferation is analogized as an incurable disease, then the
damage has been done by allowing it to spread. This new
agreement addresses future production by securing an agreement
to dismantle the manufacturing program. However, it says
nothing about disarmament - and there is no indication that it ever
will. The United States and the Russian Federation have all but
abandoned their disarmament programs, so it is very unlikely that
they would ask North Korea to disarm lest they make the case why
they should not do the same.
D. The United States
It is highly doubtful that the United States would take
unilateral action against North Korea should it be determined that
it has violated international law. This comment is not intended to
tackle the issue of the validity of unilateral action for a perceived
violation of international law. The actions in Afghanistan in 2001
and Iraq in 2003 provide recent evidence that unilateral
enforcement may be possible, but other scholars are currently
attacking this issue. There is little to no political support
domestically or internationally for such an action.
4
252 S.C. Res. 1718, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1718 (Oct. 14, 2006).
253 See February 13th Statement, supra note 59.
254 See generally Cynthia Tucker, Americans Wanted to Believe Bush's Sales Pitch
for Invasion of Iraq, BALTIMORE SUN, Oct. 23, 2006, at 15A (describing the American
public's skepticism toward acting unilaterally after the invasion of Iraq).
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E. Six-Party Talks and Multilateral Conflict Resolution
In 2002, armed with evidence of North Korea's clandestine
nuclear program, the United States declared North Korea in
violation of the 1994 Agreed Framework.255 The United States
accordingly stopped its shipment of fuel oil to North Korea, who
retaliated by reversing the freeze process it had started under the
Agreed Framework. The United States refused to engage in
bilateral talks with North Korea citing the breach of the freeze. As
a result, China brokered negotiations between the two in April
2003.256 The talks were expanded to include Russia, South Korea,
and Japan by the time the first true Six-Party Talks commenced in
Beijing in August 2003. 2" The Six-Party Talks proceeded on a
road map by the Chinese by which the input of all parties was
surveyed and then a schedule was set for resolution of the issue of
North Korean nuclearization.
258
After North Korea tested its nuclear weapon, the Chinese
called for renewed Six-Party talks. 259 The fifth round of Six-Party
Talks made the biggest leap forward and resulted in the
Agreement of February 13th.260 The tangible objectives of the
new agreement involve: the irreversible shutdown of the nuclear
facility at Yongbyon, a complete North Korean nuclear inventory,
talks to normalize diplomatic relations between North Korea and
the United States, normalization of diplomatic relations with
Japan, and economic aid and compensation for North Korea.
261
The agreement calls this an "initial phase," during which working
groups were created to implement the steps within the following
60 days.
262
255 See Harrison, supra note 47, at 99.
256 See John S. Park, Inside Multilateralism: The Six-Party Talks, 28 WASH. Q.,
Autumn 2005, at 75.
257 Id.
258 Id.
259 See Joshua Kurlantzick, China Buys the Soft Sell, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2006, at
B3.
260 See generally February 13th Statement, supra note 59 (noting that the agreement
that was recorded on Feb. 13, 1007 was a result of the fifth round of Six-Party Talks).
261 Id.
262 Id.
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The Six-Party Talks are set to reconvene on March 19,
2007 to hear reports from the working groups on the progress of
implementing the stipulations. 263  North Korea and the United
States are meeting in monumental talks that are aimed at achieving
the following: normalizing diplomatic relations, U.S. recognition
of North Korea, removal of North Korea from the list of states that
sponsor terrorism, and loosening of sanctions which will allow
North Korea to have access to the International Monetary Fund,
the World Bank, and its frozen bank accounts. 264 Though these
rounds of talks might seem like real progress, optimism must be
tempered by the lessons of the past. These independent
multilateral talks are, in a sense, a form of enforcement by
member states of international legal organizations without the
constraints of the UN Security Council where the veto rules.265 It
was under the auspices of renewed cooperation that North Korea
decided to reverse course and thwart non-proliferation efforts in
1994, 2002, and 2006266 - and there was little to no legal incentive
to curb this erratic behavior.
The Six-Party Talks are a unique chance to curb North
Korea's nuclear program, and the February 13th Agreement gives
hope that there will be tactile resolution of the matter. However,
the Six-Party talks are a unique association of regional political
267
actors who have come together to solve this particular problem.
Acting outside tactile international law to solve the problem of a
state acting outside of international law seems much more like a
stop-gap measure than a rule worth adopting.
Even more disturbing is the fact that the nuclear security of
the world rests on the impetus of a few states willing to bribe a
state like North Korea that has shown a willingness to skirt
international law. How feasible is it to think that the United States
must convene regional security talks to buy off Iran or Venezuela
should either country "go nuclear?" Problems of this sort are why
263 Id.
264 See id.
265 See generally SCHWEIGMAN, supra note 236 (discussing the structure of the UN
Security Council).
266 See Perry, supra note 28; IAEA Factsheet, supra note 7.
267 See generally February 13th Statement, supra note 59 (describing the steps to
implement the denuclearization plan).
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international organizations such as the United Nations and the
IAEA should have clear and comprehensive guidelines along with
unyielding support to fulfill their missions. 268 The United States'
unwillingness to lend full support to worldwide efforts like the
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the International Criminal Court,
and the Kyoto Protocol have helped solidify the weak ground on
which international law is laid down and enforced. 69 And though
the areas addressed by those efforts may be much easier to neglect,
nuclear weapon proliferation must be addressed with
comprehensive multilateral action backed up by the full breadth of
nations. Nuclear proliferation is different and the stakes are
higher. Clear legal rules supported by the practice of nations are
needed to shape the actions of possible lawbreakers and enforcers
alike. Relying on the formation of an ad hoc coalition every time
a new nuclear threat arises displays the kind of woeful uncertainty
that has lead to North Korea's possession of a nuclear weapon.
V. Conclusions
This paper is not meant to defend the position that North
Korea acted lawfully by testing a nuclear weapon in October 2006,
nor it is necessarily meant to condemn it. In March 2005,
President Bush said:
We cannot allow rogue states that violate their
commitments and defy the international community to
undermine the NPT's fundamental role in
strengthening international security. We must
therefore close the loopholes that allow states to
produce nuclear materials that can be used to build
bombs under the cover of civilian nuclear programs.
For international norms to be effective, they must be
enforced. 2
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The aim of this paper has been to point out how North Korea has
highlighted the loopholes of the current nuclear non-proliferation
268 SCHOFF, supra note 49, at 48.
269 See Lawrence Martin, Continental Divide: When it Comes to Treaties We Care,
GLOBE & MAIL (Can.), Mar. 23, 2006, at A23.
270 President George W. Bush, Statement (March 7, 2005), in Contemporary
Practice of the US Relating to International Law: Use of Force and Arms Control: U.S.
and Other Powers Reach Tentative Understanding on North Korea's Nuclear Program,
99 AM J. INT'L L. 715, 715 (John R. Crook ed., 2005).
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regime, making the system ineffective when dealing with a
diplomatically savvy rogue state. And as an ancillary point, this
paper hopefully conveys how alarming it is that the politics
surrounding the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty have aligned
such that the major actors have been unwilling to address the
problems underlying a flawed NPT and have instead renewed it in
perpetuity and by so doing condemned the international
community to use an ad hoc approach to protecting the world from
the proliferation of the nuclear weapons.
In its current form, the nuclear non-proliferation regime
can be opted in and out of when it suits a country, and though that
may be tolerable for other agreements, such fluidity is disturbing
when the widespread safety of the world is involved. Theories of
culpability for acquiring, and, in North Korea's case, testing
nuclear weapons are heavily limited by the overriding concern for
sovereignty and the weakness of 'good faith.'
Even if a viable legal theory is settled upon, the question of
enforcement is prominent. Given the previously mentioned
concerns over sovereignty, the course of action should come from
the U.N. Security Council; however, this too has its limitations.
The much-coveted veto power of the Security Council members
means that the body can only act to stem nuclear mischief with
complete consensus. A level of skepticism should color any
reliance on the ability of multilateral diplomatic efforts like the
Six-Party Talks to deal with situations where proliferation is
threatened.
The February 13th Agieement brings North Korea back
into the fold and offers short-term hope that this particular crisis
can be defused,27 1 but the damage has already been done. An
unstable state has been allowed to obtain nuclear weapons. The
non-proliferation regime has failed. The disarmament movement
in general has completely stopped, with the Russians and
Americans halting the scheduled depletion of their nuclear
arsenals.272 Although the new agreement, if carried out, would
271 But see Rowan Callick, North Korea Quits Nuclear Talks, AUSTRALIAN, Mar.
23, 2007 (reporting that the current round of talks has hit a snag and the North Koreans
,have left).
272 See generally GRAHAM, supra note 39 (noting the stagnation of the disarmament
movement and calling for nuclear weapons countries like the U.S. and Russia to take a
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irreversibly set back North Korea's nuclear weapon manufacturing
program, it is only a stop-gap measure as one of the most
schizophrenic nations on earth now possesses the capability to
eradicate life en masse or to sell that capability to the highest
bidder.
MATT'HEW LILES
more active disarmament role in order to promote peace and curb warfare).
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